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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether

an

insurance

company

seeking

to terminate

insurance coverage can avoid the statutory requirement of giving
written notice to an insured for the important policy reason of
affording

the

insured

coverage,

simply by

an

opportunity

inserting

language

to obtain replacement
in the contract that

insurance would terminate bt ore the expected expiration date if
an affiliated company's security interest sooner terminated.
2.

Whether the insurance policy here involved can legally

be construed to contain any automatic termination provisions when
an

amendment

to the policy

completely

restated

the relevant

provisions "to read as follows:" and then totally omitted the one
and only purported automatic termination sentence.

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Opinion below in the Utah Court of Appeals was filed
December 19, 1990 in Case No. 900052-CA.
Appendix A.

1

A copy is attached as

JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT

This Petition seeks review of an opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals which was entered on December 19, 19 90.
transferred

This case was

by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah

Appeals on January 23, 1990-

Court of

Jurisdiction was originally vested

in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII Section 3 of the Utah State Constitution, U.C.A. Section 782-2

(1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah

Supreme

Court.

Jurisdiction was conferred

Appeals pursuant to

on the Court of

U.C.A. Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3 (2)(j)

(1953 as amended), and Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.
the

Utah

Jurisdiction is once again vested, as originally, in

Supreme

Court.

Review

by writ

of

certiorari is

imperative because the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS - UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
31A-21-303
Termination of insurance policies by insurers.
(1)
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in
other statutes, or by rule under Subsection (l)(c),
this section applies to all policies of insurance other
than life and disability insurance and annuities, if
they are issued on forms which are subject to filing
and approval under Subsection 31A-21-201(1).
2

(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to
insureds than this section requires.
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially
exempt from this section classes of insurance policies
in which the insureds do not need protection against
arbitrary or unannounced termination.
(2)
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (c), no
insurance policy may be cancelled by the insurer prior
to the expiration of the agreed term or one year from
the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever
is less, except for failure to pay a premium when due
or on grounds stated in the policy. As used in this
subsection, "grounds" means:
(i) material misrepresentation;
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed,
unless the insurer should reasonably have foreseen
the change or contemplated the risk when entering
into the contract;
(iii) substantial breaches of contractual
duties, conditions, or warranties;
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the
terminal age for coverage, in which case the
insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional
return of premium; or
(v) in the case of automobile insurance,
revocation or suspension of the driver's license
of the named insured or any other person who
customarily drives the car.
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or
first class mailing of a written notice to the
policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsection
(2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium,
is effective.
Cancellation for nonpayment of premium
is effective no sooner than ten days after delivery or
first class mailing.
Notice of cancellation for
nonpayment of premium shall include a statement of the
reason for cancellation. Subsection (6) applies to the
notice required for other grounds of cancellation.

The complete text of U.C.A. section 31A-21-303 is included
in the Appendix.
Other sections included in the Appendix are
31A-21-201, 31A-21-304 and 70C-6-304.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed this action in the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County, alleging breach of insurance contract and
bad faith denial of insurance claim (R.l-5).

On cross-motions

for summary judgment, the facts presented to the trial court were
undisputed, excepting certain extrinsic and parol evidence (R.93,
94, 118, 195). Plaintiff objected to the court's consideration of
extrinsic and parol evidence presented by the Defendant (R. 94,
95, 146, 177, 178; T.5, 9, 10).

The court did in fact consider

and rely upon such extrinsic and parol evidence in formulating
its ruling and order, and granted summary judgment to Defendant
(R.196,

197, 204-206).

The

court

found

that

the

subject

insurance contract terminated of its own terms prior to the date
of Plaintiff's loss, and that notice of cancellation of insurance
was not necessary to make such termination valid (R.197, 206).
Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals ignored

the extrinsic and parol evidence, considering only the "basic
policy and amendment", but affirmed ruling as a matter of law
"that the insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance
coverage terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the
note."

(Appendix

A, p.3).

Although

it completely

omitted

discussion of statutory requirements for cancellation notices, the
Court

of

Appeals

further

held

that
4

a distinction

between

"cancellation" and "terminal i c v

~-

t- * r<:

-.

•;

notice of cancellation to Plaintiff/Petitioner•

STATEMENT
On

or

about

December

01

FACTS

20, 1983, Petitioner

Stuart

("Stuart") purchaser

n: Deere Backhoe through a retail

installment coniic:

,'^eit: i -.-:

(R.7, 28, 3 ^

^: Equipment Company

Property insurance was provided by John Deere

Insurance Company (R.9, 27, 28). The loan was to be paid in lull
on April 1,
The

<-

insurance

• - . >,
policy

which

was

issued

by

the

seller's

affiliate John Deere Insurance company and in tot:cf at the t Line of
ilit (unehd i ill i ne backhoe was an updated inland marine pol I cy,
Policy No. IM-14319, dated January 1, 1982 (the "contract") (R.64,
65, 67) .

The contract

*

»

*

:

iiisiirance coverage was Apri >

-.'.*•' s
Insurance

coverage was effective from December 20, 1983 until Apr:

i?oo

according to the Retail Contract Acceptance Form which included a
Certificate of Physical Damage Insurance (R.9).

In addition, the

front page of the actual policy stated that it was in effect from
January 1, 1982

Cancelled" (R.67).

Thus, barring default

or other such event terminating the insurance prematurely, the
backhoe was to be insured through April 1, 1988, under siiclI policy
5

(R.29,

30)-

Stuart

made

all

insurance payments, made all

installment payments, and generally performed all its obligations
under the purchase contract for the backhoe on a timely basis
(R.2, 3, 4, 7, 17, 28, 39-44).
$2,972.29

was

paid

by

coverage on the backhoe

A lump sum insurance premium of

Stuart

for physical damage

insurance

for the entire contemplated

term of

coverage between December 20, 198 3 and April 1, 1988 (R.7,9).
Defendant/Respondent

John Deere Insurance Company did not

terminate the insurance on the backhoe under the cancellation
provisions

of

the

Insurance

Contract, nor did

it terminate

insurance coverage in compliance with any Utah statute relating
to

cancellation

of

insurance.

It

never

gave

notice

of

cancellation to Stuart prior to April 1, 1988 (R.119, 125).
On or about February 5, 1988, Stuart made a final payment on
its obligation under the backhoe installment purchase contract,
paying the purchase obligation in full earlier than required (R.
28).

However, the UCC filings evidencing the security interest

of John Deere in the backhoe remained in place as of March 9,
1988, and had not been formally released (R. 32;T. 17) .

On March

9, 1988, the backhoe was destroyed by a fire of unknown origin.
Stuart made its claim in a timely fashion under the insurance
contact.

Respondent John Deere Insurance Company denied the claim

(R.28).
6

Responden t

intern a J 1 j

c r e d i 1: e ci S t ; u a i: t ' s • • L C C o u :I: I t

i i I 1 he

insurance company's records for unearned insurance premiums on or
about February 5 , 1 9 8 8 (R. 44 )
receive a n

However, Stuart d Id nc 1 actually

re f u:i Ici of I ineai : i Ieci i i IsI 11:ance • pi: em i I Ims i Ii I L i 1 after

the fire destroyed the backhoe on March 9, 1989 (R.44; T" 1 7)
The
Deere

insurance

Ii ISU rai i

actual

contract
M.. .

insurance

policy

va-

prepared

.

...

until

unilaterally

-ithpr

after

the

saw

nnr

Marcl

.

by

John

read
1 988

the
fire

destroyed the backhoe (R.64, 1 2 4 ) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
STATUTORY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS PRECLUDE
TERMINATION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE WITHOUT PROPER
PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF SUCH TERMINATION.
This
because
an

H

petition

for

'

\ +,

writ

cf

sh

^ , t-i - , s . i

• -*
nderlyiny

ceri iorai

public

policy

\\\^r-

-id

r

granted

• i ,\ ; pecj i
expressly

statute

prohibit

cancellation or termination of insurance coverage without advance
notice to the insured
In

order

arbitrary

or

enacted section
Section

to

Its opini !. : • ^ not mention the statute.

provide

unannounced

an

important

termination",

"protection
the

1itah

Legislature

Jhapter 2] c £ I he Insurance Code.

31A-21-303(1)(c).

The

heading
7

of

that

against

section

U.C.A.
reads:

"Termination of insurance policies by insurers."

Except under

limited circumstances not relevant here, Section 303 prohibits an
insurer

from

providing

cancelling

written

an

notice

insurance

of

the

policy

intended

without

first

termination.

By

requiring cancellation notices, the section fosters the important
social policy of avoiding uninsured losses.

The mailing of a

simple cancellation notice does not seem burdensome.

Respondent

seeks to abdicate its responsibility as an insurance company to
give the simple and inexpensive termination notices that could
avoid the catastrophic uninsured losses such as occurred here.
Whether

an

insurer

can avoid

compliance with

section

303 by

inserting automatic termination language in an insurance policy
is an important question of state law which has not been, but
should be, settled by the Supreme Court of Utah.

It should be

answered with a resounding "NO!"
Respondent

successfully

contended

below that the subject

insurance contract silently terminated without any requirement of
notice of cancellation to the insured.
State of Utah precludes

However, the law of the

arbitrary or unannounced termination,

unless a class of insurance has been exempted from protection
from

unannounced

303(1)(c).

termination.

See, U.C.A.

Section

31A-21-

The subject insurance contract does not fall under

such an exempted class of insurance.
8

The statute is in accordance

with the general rule of law stating that provisions for notice of
cancellation

of

insurance

policies

are

intended

to prevent

cancellation of a policy without allowing the insured ample time
to obtain other insurance.

Seef Taxter v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.,

721 P.2d 972f 974 (Wash. App. 1986);

Crowley v. Lafevette Life

Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 858 (Idaho 1984).

Thus, Utah law requires

notice of cancellation, and does not allow secret termination of
insurance

coverage.

The

minimum

notice

required

before

termination is either ten (10) days or thirty (30) days after
delivery of notice of cancellation, depending on the type of
policy and reason for cancellation.

U.C.A. Section 70C-6-304;

U.C.A. Section 31A-21-303(2)(b) and (3).
Although Stuart argued that statutory restrictions precluded
silent terminations, the Court of Appeals erred in completely
failing to address the issue.
summarily
because

a

occurred.

held

Instead, the Court of Appeals

that no notice was

"termination,"

as opposed

"required
to a

by the policy"

"cancellation" had

Such distinctions are without a meaningful difference

when it comes to providing the important protection the Utah
legislature sought to afford to consumers.
heading

to

section

303

of

the

Note that the very

Insurance

"Termination of insurance policies by insurers."

9

Code

is entitled

The general rule under section 303 requires notice be given
of cancellation or termination.

Exceptions, none of which apply

here, are specifically enumerated.
is significant.
allowable

U.C.A. section 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv) is one of the

"grounds"

cancellation.

However, one of the exceptions

that

may

be

stated

in

the

policy

for

Although it appears to be an exception to the

general rule, it specifically requires cancellation notice where
the insured has attained "the age specified as the terminal age
for coverage."

U.C.A. 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv). In such a case, even

though all parties anticipate at the outset that coverage will end
at

a

"terminal

termination

age", notice

event is reached.

is

still

required

once

that

Even though such a policy is

expected to expire by its own terms at a specified time, the
legislature imposed the minor burden of cancellation notices upon
the insurer to avoid the catastrophic burden of uninsured losses
on an insured who may not have read, understood, or remembered the
fine

print

reasoned

termination

and

rational

provisions.

legislative decision.

legislature clearly contemplated
precede

every

That represents

a well

Thus, the Utah

that cancellation notice must

termination, whether

it properly be called a

cancellation or not.
One limited exception exists where the termination is for
nonpayment of premiums at the normally scheduled expiration date
10

occurring at the "end of the one-year policy term."

Clarke v.

American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Ut. App. 1988).
that situation no

In

"reminder" notice of cancellation is needed

because the insured obviously knows of his own present delinquency
in making premium payments.

In this case, however, the contract

was not scheduled to expire until April 1, 1988.

Premiums had

been fully paid nearly five years previously through April 1,
1988.
The Respondent admitted (R. 119, 125), that it did not give
notice of either termination or cancellation.

In addition, no

constructive notice of termination or cancellation was given prior
to time of loss, whereas Plaintiff did not receive a full refund
of insurance premiums until after the date of loss (R.44; T.17),
nor did John Deere formally release its security interest in the
backhoe prior to March 9, 1988

(R.32; T.17).

Therefore, any

termination of the Plaintiff's insurance coverage was a secret
termination, which is not allowed by either law or public policy
in Utah, even if it could be construed as being authorized by
"boilerplate"
unilaterally

language

in

an

insurance

by the insurance company.

contract

The Utah

drafted

legislature

recognized that is unrealistic to expect the layman to have read,
understood, and remembered

(for five years here) technical fine

print provisions regarding termination.
11

Therefore, by statute it

prohibited

shifting

the enormous risk

Petitioner

as

a result

"reminder"

notice of

of uninsured

of Respondent's

cancellation.

losses to

failure to give any

For

sound

public policy

reasons, the insurer, by its artful drafting cannot evade the
responsibilities imposed by the Utah legislature.
This is an important question of state law which has not
been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court of Utah,
insurance

company must not be allowed

to terminate

An

coverage

without prior written notice, even if the contract provisions
would seem to permit it.

To hold otherwise flys in the face of

the statute, undermines the security and reasonable expectations
of insured persons, and increases the likelihood of unnecessary
and unexpected losses which are not insured.

ARGUMENT
POINT II:
THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE IN THE AMENDED
INSURANCE CONTRACT ON WHICH THE COURT COULD
BASE ITS DECISION THAT INSURANCE COVERAGE
TERMINATED AUTOMATICALLY PRIOR TO APRIL 1,
1988, AND WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE INSURED.
Even

if

there

were

no

important

public

policy

reasons

codified by the legislature which preclude silent terminations,
the contract itself did not allow such in this case.
contract originally purported

While the

to sanction such conduct by the
12

Respondent, an endorsement or amendment eliminated that language.
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in construing the
amendment.
The Trial Court correctly held the "contract" consisted only
of the actual policy and the endorsement.

Finding the "contract"

integrated, clear, and unambiguous, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals ruled as a matter of law regarding its interpretation.
Upon

review

construction

the Supreme Court
any

interpretation

particular

under

the

should

accord

weight, and

correctness

neither

should

standard.

court's

review the
Craig Food

Industries, Inc. v. Weihinq 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987);
Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
Respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals held that the
insurance contract terminated automatically on February 5, 1988,
pursuant to the second sentence of the original Item 3 of the
contract.

The entire Item 3, (cons* ting of only two sentences)

before amendment, "reads as follows:"
3.

ATTACHMENT OF INSURANCE
The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those
items of merchandise on which, according to the Named
Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the time the
financing agreement was made and as respects each such item,
the insurance shall attach as of (a) the time the Additional
Insured takes possession thereof of (b) the time of
execution and acceptance of the note, whichever occurs
first.
This insurance terminates when the actual maturity
date of the note is reached or the date on which the
security interest of John Deere in said equipment
terminates, whichever first occurs.
13

Because of the second

sentence, Respondent

argues

that early

payment by Stuart of the obligation on the backhoe in full on
February

5,

termination
Insurance

1988
of

resulted

the

Company

in

insurance
did

not

the automatic

and

unannounced

contract, and that John Deere

have

to

comply

with

the notice

requirements under the cancellation provisions of the contract or
under Utah State law to have this termination take effect (R.2933, 68, 119-121).

The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to rule

as to the applicability

of

the statutory

cancellation notice

requirements and should be reversed on that basis alone.
Point

I, supra).

further

erred

as a matter of

insurance contract.
contract was
provision

Moreover, reversal

is mandated

law in construing

(See,

because it
the amended

Using these significant prefatory words, the

"amended to read as follows:" by an endorsement

effective

September

1, 1983, omitting the automatic

termination language (R.81). Relevant to Item 3, the Endorsement
states:
This endorsement issued by the John Deere Insurance Company
forms a part of the policy number stated herein and takes
effect as of the effective date also stated herein. ...
It is agreed Item 3, Attachment
amended to read as follows:

of

Insurance, is

Attachment of Insurance
3. The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to
those items of financed merchandise or additional
security on which, according to the Named
14

Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the
time the financing agreement was made.
As
respects each item of financed merchandise, the
insurance shall attach as of (a) the time the
Additional Insured takes possession thereof of (b)
the time of acceptance of the note by John Deere,
whichever occurs first. As respects each item of
additional security, the insurance shall attach as
of the time of acceptance of the note by John
Deere.
In amending
previous

the

second

contract, Respondent

completely omitted the

sentence which purported

automatic termination

to allow

silent and

(R.68, 81). The small pre-printed portion

at the bottom of the Endorsement form stated:

"Nothing herein

contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter or extend any of
the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the policy
other

than

as

herein

stated"

(R.81).

Here, the

specific

endorsement did expressly state how the entire amended Item 3 was
"to read" in full.

It did not state that only the first sentence

of Item 3 was "amended to read as follows."

It was "Item 3" that

was amended, not the first sentence of Item 3.
contract

contained

a provision

under

"Additional Conditions," that stated:

Furthermore, the

paragraph

22 entitled

"All conditions of the

printed policy that are at variance or in conflict with the terms
and provisions of any endorsement attached to said printed policy
are hereby waived" (R.74).

After amendment, Item 3 in the printed

policy was "at variance" with the revised Item 3 as contained in
15

the

endorsement.

contract

after

Thus, the only proper construction
the replacing

amendment

of the

is that no automatic

termination language survived.
In an attempt to show that the omission of the termination
sentence was merely a unilateral typographical mistake, Defendant
introduced

documents extrinsic

to the Insurance Contract

(the

Installment Contract and the Acceptance Form) and parol evidence
in the form of the Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky (R.27, 29-31,
121-125, 128- 137).

Although they were improperly considered by

the trial court over Plaintiff's objections, the Court of Appeals
ignored them in its Opinion.

It

stated

that

they

were

"not

relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion because the contract was
unambiguous."

(Appendix

A).

Because

those documents are

extrinsic or parol evidence, the Supreme Court, as did the Court
of Appeals, should disregard

such evidence in formulating its

interpretation and construction of the subject Insurance Contract.
See, Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Zumstein, 675 P.2d at 734;
Stanqer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P. 2d at 1205.
Insurance

Contract

here

is

integrated

and

The

unambiguous, and

accordingly, the evidence proffered by Defendant on this issue
should be ignored.

Note also, that any such error would be

Respondent's unilateral mistake, and not a basis for reformation.

16

This

insurance

contract was drafted

unilaterally

by the

insurance company Respondent and the general rule of contract
interpretation in Utah would require that any ambiguous contract
language

be

construed

against

the party who drafted

it and

favorably towards the other party against whom it is invoked.
See, Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America 669 P.2d 410, 417
(Utah 1983);

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty and Fin.

Inc. , 544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975).
needed

That favoritism is not even

here, however, as there simply is no ambiguity.

amended paragraph

3 clearly varied

The

from the original and was

expressly made an entire replacement when it was amended "to read
as follows."

These four underlined words were apparently also

overlooked by the Court of Appeals, as they are not even mentioned
in

the

opinion.

Those

four

significant words allow

for no

interpretation other than that a complete substitution occurred.
Being so amended, the policy at issue gives absolutely no
indication, within

its

four corners, that the contract will

terminate or expire by its own terms anytime prior to the date of
maturity of the original note

(April 1, 1988).

An insurance

contract which contains no terms by which the contract may expire,
cannot, as a matter of law (as well as a matter of common sense),
expire by its own terms.

Where no terms describing the means of

expiration existed in the contract, expiration simply could not
17

occur prior to cancellation, even if statutes and public policy
would

otherwise

allow it.

Here, statutes and public policy

prohibit it, and the amended contract does not allow for it.
Requirements
Utah,

for cancellation

See, U.C.A.

Section 70C-6-304.

Section

are codified by statute in

31A-21-303(2)(b) and

(3); U.C.A.

Clarke v. American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P. 2d

470, 473 (Ut. App. 1988).

The Court of Appeals erred when it

failed to even address the statutory requirements.

Under those

statutes, John Deere was required to give at least ten (10) days
notice,

and

cancellation.

as much
Id.

as

thirty

(30) days notice, prior to

Respondent, by its own admission, failed to

comply with the contract's terms and the statutory requirements
regarding

cancellation

notices

contract provision dealing with

(R.119, 125).

There being no

termination of insurance, and

because there was no cancellation prior to the time loss occurred
on March 8, 1988, the insurance was still in full force and effect
at the time the Plaintiff's property was destroyed.

Therefore,

the Supreme Court should reverse the affirmance by the Court of
Appeals of the trial court's decision and award summary judgment
to

the

Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner

on its Cross-Motion

for

Summary Judgment.
This case concerns important social policies that the Utah
legislature safeguarded by enacting U.C.A. 31A-21-303.
18

As an

insurance company, Respondent can not be allowed to evade its
responsibilities.

Otherwise, dangerous precedent will be set

that dilutes the protections and policy carefully enacted as law
in the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred as a
matter

of

Judgment

law
and

in granting
in not

Summary Judgment.
reversible

error.

Respondent's

granting

Motion

Petitioner's

for Summary

Cross-Motion

for

Affirmance by the Court of Appeals was also
Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner, therefore,

requests the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and the
lower court's Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint
with Prejudice, and to grant summary judgment to Petitioner on its
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1991.

Jiowjlas M. Durbano
Paul H. Johnson
David L. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant/Petitioner
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed and/or hand
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition
for Writ of

Certiorari

to Mark

0. Morris

of Ray, Quinney &

Nebeker at 79 South Main Street, P.O. Box 45385, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84145-0385, postage pre-paid, on this
January, 1991.

20

day of

APPENDIX A

B £d_scur
DEC 19 1390
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

<*Wry T Noonan
Clem cure Court
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Stuart, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 900052-CA
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(December 19, 1990)

John Deere Insurance Company,
Defendant and Appellee,

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Attorneys:

Douglas M. Durbano, Paul H. Johnson and David
Miller, Ogden, for Appellant
Mark 0. Morris, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Stuart, Inc. (Stuart) appeals from a summary judgment
dismissing its claim of breach of contract. Stuart asserts
three claims of error: (1) there was a genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether the insurance contract was an
integrated document; (2) the trial court improperly derived the
intent of the parties from extrinsic and parol evidence; and
(3) the trial court erred in finding that the insurance
contract terminated prior to April 1, 1988, without notice of
cancellation. Stuart claims that any one of the above errors
would preclude the trial court from granting summary judgment
to John Deere Insurance Company (John Deere). Thus, Stuart
asserts that we should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on John Deere*s motion and grant the
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from John
Deere Industrial Equipment Company on a retail installment

contract. John Deere issued an insurance policy covering the
backhoe. On February 5, 1988, Stuart made the final payment on
the installment contract. On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was
destroyed by fire. Stuart made a claim under the insurance
contract, which was denied by John Deere.1
On August 1, 1988, Stuart filed a complaint alleging
breach of contract by John Deere. After oral arguments, based
on the stipulated material facts, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of John Deere* Stuart appealed.
ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW
Stuart first argues that there was an issue of material
fact pending before the trial court. Stuart asserts that
whether the contract was ambiguous or integrated concerning the
parties* intent is a factual question. Here, Stuart is
confusing two separate doctrines of contract law. These
doctrines concern (1) whether a written contract is fully
integrated so as to trigger the parol evidence rule; and (2)
whether a provision of a written contract is ambiguous so that
extrinsic evidence must be considered to construe it.
First, whether a contract is an integration is a question
of fact. Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182,
183 (Utah 1983). If the contract is not integrated, parol
evidence is admissible to determine the parties* intent even if
it means varying a term of the written part of the parties'
overall agreement. Here, Stuart did not raise any facts
suggesting the parties had any agreement or understandings
other than as set out in the written contract documents.
The second legal doctrine concerns whether any material
term of the contract is ambiguous. "Interpretation of a
written contract is ordinarily a question of law, and this
court need not defer to the trial court's construction." Jones
v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Provo Citv Corp. v.
Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). "Contract
provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that
the parties urge diverse interpretations." Jones, 611 P.2d at
735. While extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist in the
interpretation of ambiguous terms, the threshold question of
whether a provision is ambiguous is a question of law. See,
e.g., Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
1. Both of the parties stipulate that these are the undisputed
material facts of the case.

We find the provisions of the basic policy and amendment to be
entirely unambiguous, as did the trial court. Thus, we
construe the critical contractual provisions as a matter of law,
The primary policy of the insured contained the following
termination provision: "This insurance terminates when the
actual maturity date of the note is reached or the date on
which the security interest of John Deere in said equipment
terminates, whichever first occurs." An amendment to the
policy was made on September 1, 1983, without mention of the
above termination provision. The amendment to the original
policy contained the following saving language: "Nothing
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the
policy, other than as herein stated." The trial court
concluded as a matter of law that, after the above amendment,
"the basic policy . . . remained the same, including that
aforementioned statement concerning termination of the policy
when the security interest of John Deere was satisfied." We
agree with the trial court's legal determination. When Stuart
paid the debt, John Deere no longer had an insurable security
interest in the backhoe. Thus, the insurance policy coverage
ended when Stuart paid off the balance owing on the retail
installment contract. We conclude as matter of law that the
insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance coverage
terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the note.
Although the trial court had before it certain extrinsic
evidence, it was not relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion
because the contract was unambiguous. Thus, we need not
consider Stuart's second issue further.
EXPIRATION OR CANCELLATION
Stuart also claims that John Deere cancelled the policy
without prior notice to the insured as required by the policy.
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion that
John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation" in the
insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon, or cancel <
contract of insurance. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 380 (1982).
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such action
was not necessary. The policy expired based upon its own
terms. "The usual effect of a termination of a policy is the
termination of coverage thereunder, and where a policy expires
by its own terms . . . at a specified time, generally no basis
exists thereafter upon which to predicate a recovery." 43 Am.
Jur. 2d Insurance § 237 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Here, the
policy was not cancelled as Stuart claims, but instead expired

900052-CA
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pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties. The policy
contained a provision that it would terminate when John Deere
Industrial Equipment Company's security interest in the backhoe
terminated. When Stuart paid off the backhoe, John Deere
Industrial Equipment Company had no further insurable interest
in the backhoe. Thus, the policy expired simultaneously with
the expiration of John Deere Industrial Equipment Company's
interest in the backhoe and notice was not required. We affirm,

Norman H. Jackson^Judge

WE CONCUR:

Q<Ml )77
Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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In the Second Judicial District Court
-«••

in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utah
STUART, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DEERE INSURANCE,
Defendant.

]I
]
]I
]
]

:. _ _ jS. .

RULING ON MOTIONS

Civil No. 43933

The defendant's motion for summary judgment and the
plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment came before the
court for oral argument on September 5, 1989, with Douglas M.
Durbano appearing for the plaintiff and Mark 0. Morris appearing
for the defendant.
After oral argument, the court took the
motions under advisement. The court now rules on the motions.
In the defendant's memorandum, page three, there was a
statement of undisputed material facts.
Both of the parties
stipulate that these are the undisputed material facts of the
case. About December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from
John Deere on a retail installment contract.
The defendant
issued an insurance policy covering the backhoe. On February 5,
1988, Stuart made the final payment on his obligations under the
contract. On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was destroyed by fire.
Both parties agree that this case can be decided by reference to
the policy.
It is therefore a law question for the court to
decide.
The legal arguments that the parties focus on are found in
paragraph three, page one of the policy which states as follows:
"This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date of the
note is reached or the date on which the security interest of
John Deere in said equipment terminates, whichever occurs first."

FILMED

The plaintiff was in receipt of two documents.
One was
called a certificate of physical damage insurance. The other is
the installment note.
Both documents make it clear that "the
insurance shall terminate immediately without notice if any one
of the following events occur: The indebtedness is discharged;
John DeereT s security interest in the property which is the
subject of the contract terminates."
These documents are not
part of the insurance contract because they are not issued by the
defendant, but they are indications of what the parties intended
to contract with the insurance company. The plaintiff refers to
a policy amendment which amended the primary policy but did not
include the clause
"this insurance terminates when the actual
maturity date of the note is reached or the date in which the
security interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates
whichever first occurs."
The purpose of the amendment was to
include other security and was not intended to change the terms
of the policy itself.
The endorsement states that "nothing
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the
policy, other than as stated herein."
The basic policy,
therefore remained the same, including that aforementioned
statement concerning termination of the policy when the security
interest of John Deere was satisfied. It is also important to
note that when the contract was paid off by the plaintiff, John
Deere refunded the balance of the unearned insurance premium to
the plaintiff.
It is also of interest to the court that the
plaintiff never actually saw the policy itself until after the
destruction of the insured property. John Deere Company was the
primary insured party and the plaintiff was only secondarily
insured.
The termination of insurance provision does not appear in
the endorsement due only to a typographical error. This was a
mistake on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff was not even

aware of the provisions of the policy or the typographical error
and did not rely on it until after the loss of equipment.
The plaintiff also complains that the defendant cancelled
the policy. This is not borne out by the facts in the case. The
insurance contract terminated naturally by the payment in full of
the proceeds of the installment note to John Deere and was not
cancelled by the defendant. The defendant's motion for summary
judgment is therefore granted and the plaintiff's cross motion
for summary judgment is denied.
The defendant is ordered to draw a formal order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated September 13, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

r

/
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JUDGE—
Certificate of Mailing:
/
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Douglas M. Durbano,
United Savings Plaza, #320, 4185 Harrison Blvd., Ogden, Utah
84403 and Mark 0. Morris, P. 0. Box 45385, Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385 on September 14, 1989.

Deputy Clerk
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Mark 0. Morris (A4636)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: 801 532-1500
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STUART, INC., a Utah
corporation,

:
:
:

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
WITH PREJUDICE

:

Civil No. CV-43933

Plaintiff,
vs .
JOHN DEERE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

:
ooOoo

Defendant John Deere Insurance Company's ("John Deere")
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff Stuart, Inc.'s
("Stuart") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment came on for regularly
scheduled hearing on September 5, 1989.
on behalf John Deere.
plaintiff.

Mark O. Morris appeared

Douglas M. Durbano appeared on behalf of

Based upon the parties' memoranda, the affidavits on

file, and oral argument, and pursuant to Rules 52, 54, and 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting that there were no
genuine issues of material fact.

0 1 Hen

FINDINGS OF
1.

T^S^/U^^

On or about December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a

1984 John Deere 510B Wheel Loader Backhoe, serial no. BF707463
through a retail installment contract ("Contract") with John
Deere.

Property insurance was provided to Stuart in connection

with this purchase through John Deere.

The loan was to be paid

off by April 1, 1988.
2.

Part of the Contract included a Certificate of

Physical Damage Insurance, which states, in part, "The insurance
shall terminate immediately without notice if any one of the
following events occurs: the indebtedness is discharged; John
Deere1s security interest in the property which is the subject of
the contract terminates. . . . "

Under the Contract's section

entitled "ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES", it states, in part,
"If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I (we) will
be furnished a certificate which describes the insurance.

Such

insurance shall terminate if the indebtedness is discharged, or if
the holder's security interest in the equipment terminates . . .
."

All documents received by Stuart at the time of purchase

contained language similar or identical to that quoted above.
3.

The insurance policy that covered the Backhoe and

under which Stuart makes its claim, is an inland marine policy,
number IM-14319 ("Policy").

A true ahd correct copy of the Policy
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7.

On March 9, 1988, the Backhoe was destroyed by a

fire of unknown origin; thereafter Stuart made its claim under the
Policy, which claim was denied by John Deere.
8.

Stuart did not see the Policy until after the

Backhoe's fire, nor did Stuart rely upon the September 1, 1983
amendment to the Policy prior to the Backhoe's fire.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW / / V ^
1.

This Court concludes that on February 5, 1988, upon

the discharge of Stuart's indebtedness and the termination of John
Deere's security interest, and upon Stuart's receiving a credit
for the unearned insurance premium, the Policy terminated, of its
own terms.
2.

The Policy was not cancelled by John Deere.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Defendant John Deere Insurance Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff Stuart, Inc.'s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
It is hereby Ordered that Plaintiff's Complaint against
Defendant be dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits
DATED this

^

-' /
s<'

day of -September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:
/

/

/

Honorable Dougiajs Cornaby

D i s t r i c t Court iJludqe
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APPENDIX D

INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

31A-21-301

PART II
APPROVAL OF FORMS
31A-21-201. Filing and approval of forms.
(1) No form subject to Subsection 31A-21-10H1), except as exempted under
Subsections 31A-21-10K2) through 31A-21-10H6), may be used unless it has
been filed with the commissioner.
(2) (a) The commissioner may at any time disapprove a form upon a finding
that:
(i) it is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive,
obscure, or encourages misrepresentation;
(ii) it provides benefits or contains other provisions that endanger
the solidity of the insurer;
(iii) in the case of the basic policy, though not applicable to riders
and endorsements, it fails to provide the exact name of the insurer
and its state of domicile; or
(iv) it violates a statute or a rule adopted by the commissioner, or
is otherwise contrary to law.
(b) Whenever the commissioner disapproves a form under Subsection
(2)(a), the commissioner may order that, on or before a date not less than
30 nor more than 90 days after the order, the use of the form be discontinued or that appropriate changes be made.
(c) The commissioner's disapproval under this Subsection (2) shall be
in writing and constitutes an order. This order shall state the reasons for
disapproval in reasonable detail to guide the insurer in reformulating its
proposals or appealing the order.
(3) Insurance policy forms need not conform to the requirements of this
chapter until July 1, 1987, though insurance policies issued after July 1,1986,
are subject to Section 31A-21-107.
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-201, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10,
§ 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 (2nd S.SJ

amendment, effective September 5, 1988, substituted "its state of domicile" for "the full address of its home or regional office" in Subsection i2)(aMiii).

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in other statutes, or by
rule under Subsection (l)(c), this section applies to all policies of insurance other than life and disability insurance and annuities, if they are
issued on forms which are subject to filing and approval under Subsection
31A-21-20K1).
(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to insureds than this
section requires.
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially exempt from this
section classes of insurance policies in which the insureds do not need
protection against arbitrary or unannounced termination.
(d) The rights provided by this section are in addition to and do not
prejudice any other rights the insureds may have at common law or under
other statutes.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), no insurance policy may be
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed term or one
year from the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever is less,
except for failure to pay a premium when due or on grounds stated in the
policy. As used in this subsection, "grounds" means:
(i) material misrepresentation;
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed, unless the insurer
should reasonably have foreseen the change or contemplated the risk
when entering into the contract;
(hi) substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions, or warranties:
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the terminal age for coverage, in which case the insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional return of premium; or
(v) in the case of automobile insurance, revocation or suspension of
the driver's license of the named insured or any other person who
customarily drives the car.
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or first class mailing of a
written notice to the policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsection (2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium, is effective.
Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is effective no sooner than ten
days after delivery or first class mailing. Notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium shall include a statement of the reason for cancella116

liNOUIV/\nuJ& b u n w v n v / i k j i n \-t.

tion. Subsection (6) applies to the notice required for other grounds of
cancellation.
(c) Subsections (2)1 SL) and <b) do not apply to any insurance contract
that has not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect
less than 60 days when the notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered.
No cancellation under this subsection is effective until at least (10) days
after the delivery to the insured of a written notice of cancellation. If the
notice is sent by tirst class mail, postage prepaid, to the insured at his last
known address, delivery is considered accomplished after the passing,
since the mailing date, of the mailing time specified in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Policy cancellations subject to this subsection are not
subject to the procedures described in Subsection (6).
(3) A policy may be issued for a term longer than one year or for an indefinite term, with a clause providing for cancellation by the insurer by giving
notice as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(i) 30 days prior to any anniversaury
date.
(4) (a) Subject to Subsections (2), (3), (4Kb), and (4)(c), a policyholder has a
right to have the policy renewed, on the terms then being applied by the
insurer to similar risks, for an additional period of time equivalent to the
expiring term if the agreed term is one year or less, or for one year if the
agreed term is longer than one year.
(b) The right to renewal mder Subsection (4)(a) is extinguished if:
(i) at least 30 days p< or to the policy expiration or anniversary
date a notice of intention not to renew the policy beyond the agreed
expiration or anniversary date is delivered or sent by first class mail
by the insurer to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known
address:
(ii) not more than 45 nor less than 14 days prior to the due date of
the renewal premium, the insurer delivers or sends by first class mail
a notice to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known address,
clearly stating the renewal premium, how it may be paid, and that
failure to pay the renewal premium by the due date extinguishes the
policyholder's right to renewal:
(iii) the policyholder has accepted replacement coverage, or has
requested or agreed to nonrenewal: or
(iv) the policy is expressly designated as nonrenewable.
(5) (a) Subject to Subsection (5)(b), if the insurer offers or purports to renew
the policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, the new terms or
rates take effect on the renewal date if the insurer delivered or sent by
first class mail to the policyholder notice of the new terms or rates at least
30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy. If the insurer did
not give this prior notification to the policyholder, the new terms or rates
do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is delivered or sent by first
class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect to cancel the renewal
policy at any time during the 30-day period. Return premiums or additional premium charges shall be calculated proportionately on the basis
that the old rates apply.
(b) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply if the only change in terms that is
adverse to the policyholder is a rate increase generally applicable to the
class of business to which the policy belongs, a rate increase resulting
from a classification change based on the altered nature or extent of the
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risk insured against, or a policy form change made to make the form
consistent with Utah law.
(6) If a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal under Subsection (2Kb) does
not state with reasonable precision the facts on which the insurer's decision is
based, the insurer shall send by first class mail or deliver that information
within ten working days after receipt of a written request by the policyholder.
This notice is not effective unless it contains information about the policyholder's right to make the request.
(7) If a risk-sharing plan under Section 31A-2-214 exists for the kind of
coverage provided by the insurance being cancelled or nonrenewed, no notice
of cancellation or nonrenewal required under Subsection (2Kb) or (4)(b)(i) is
effective unless it contains instructions to the policyholder for applying for
insurance through the available risk-sharing plan.
(8) There is no liability on the p a n of, and no cause of action against, any
insurer, its authorized representatives, agents, employees, or any other person furnishing to the insurer information relating to the reasons for cancellation or nonrenewal or for any statement made or information given by them
in complying or enabling the insurer to comply with this section unless actual
malice is proved by clear and convincing evidence.
(9) This section does not alter any common law right of contract rescission
for material misrepresentation.
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-303, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 144;
1987, ch. 91, § 47; 1987, ch. 95, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 91, made a minor change in
phraseology in Subsection (7).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 95, efTec-

tive March 16, 1987, substituted "30" for "20"
in the first sentence of Subsection (2Kb).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Although referred to
in Subsection (4)(a), as enacted and amended,
this section contains no Subsection (4)(c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Renewal.
—Nonpayment.
As a matter of law. an insurer did not waive
its right to refuse a late renewal payment and

deny coverage, by its conduct in previously accepting a late installment payment. Clarke v.
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance,
44 A.L.R.4th 13.
Fidelity bond termination clause on taking
over of insured by another business entity: construction ana effect, 44 A.L.R.4th 1195.

Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policv providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.

31A-21-304.

Special cancellation provisions.

Whether or not Section 31A-21-303 is also applicable:
(1) Section 31A-21-305 applies to cancellation on request of a premium
imance company;
a J d ) S e C t l ° n 7 0 C * 6 " 3 0 4 a PP"es to cancellation upon request of a creditor;
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(3) Sections 41-12a-404 and 41-12a-405 apply to the cancellation or
other termination of insurance coverage or of a surety bond after the
insurer or surety has provided a certificate of insurance or suretyship to
the Department of Public Safety.
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-304. enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, 4 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 145;
1987, ch. 91, § 48.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (2), substituted "70C-6304" for "70B-4-304."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance,
44 A.L.R.4th 13.

70C-6-304.

Cancellation by creditor.

A creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or liability
insurance except after the debtor's default or in accordance with a written
authorization by the debtor, and in either case the cancellation does not take
effect until written notice is delivered to the debtor or mailed to him at his
address as stated by him. The notice shall state that the policy may be cancelled on a date not less than ten days after the notice is delivered, or, if the
notice is mailed, not less than 13 days after it is mailed.

